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Abstract—The amount of connected devices in the
industrial environment is growing continuously, due to
the ongoing demands of new features like predictive
maintenance. New business models require more data,
collected by IIoT edge node sensors based on inexpensive
and low performance Microcontroller Units (MCUs). A
negative side effect of this rise of interconnections is the
increased attack surface, enabled by a larger network
with more network services. Attaching badly documented
and cheap devices to industrial networks often without
permission of the administrator even further increases the
security risk. A decent method to monitor the network
and detect “unwanted” devices is network scanning. Typ-
ically, this scanning procedure is executed by a computer
or server in each sub-network. In this paper, we introduce
network scanning and mapping as a building block to
scan directly from the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT)
edge node devices. This module scans the network in a
pseudo-random periodic manner to discover devices and
detect changes in the network structure. Furthermore, we
validate our approach in an industrial testbed to show
the feasibility of this approach.
Index Terms—network scanning; iiot; security; edge
device; building block
I. INTRODUCTION
New business models, like predictive maintenance
which takes a proactive approach maintaining machin-
ery and equipment to keep downtime to a minimum, re-
quire more data exchange between production systems
and other devices. Due to this constant digitalization in
industrial plants and in the manufacturing industry, a
higher degree of networking is necessary. Especially
low-cost edge node devices like smart sensors are
getting attached to systems enabling Industrial Inter-
net of Things (IIoT) applications [1]. The increased
interconnections and the amount of devices enlarge
the attack surface, leading to new security challenges
[2]. To reduce this security risk within the indus-
trial control network, a suitable option is network
monitoring. Thereby, a distinction between active and
passive network monitoring is done. Passive network
monitoring is e.g. done by capturing the traffic on a
network switch with a monitoring port, connected to
the sub-network. This variant passively sniffs the traffic
within the network, without additional traffic sent into
the investigated network. The second method is active
scanning, which sending additional packets into the ob-
served network. Furthermore, the scanning procedure
requires “access” to every single sub-network or a scan
node in every separated network. On the one hand, the
implementation is associated with high efforts, which
on the other hand results in high costs.
In this paper, we introduce an active network map-
ping tool, as a building block for embedded low-
cost edge node devices. This security building block
enables probing of devices (hosts) and services in the
network directly from an edge node device, connected
to this network, without the requirement of additional
components. After the edge node is placed into the
network and the system is put into operation for the
first time, the edge node scans the network and learns
the structure of the network architecture. This default
network “fingerprint” is stored locally on the edge and
is compared with further scans. If the network changes
during further scans, this indicates an anomaly, which
will be reported e.g. to the operator.
The contributions of edge node based network map-
ping are:
• Easy integration with current network state recog-
nition of other participants.
• New devices in the network can be found.
• New services with open ports will be detected.
• Hosts and services which change the status are
recognized.
• The information of the network scan is only on
the “intelligent” edge node, so that attackers could
not exploit this feature. Thus, the edge node only
has to trust itself and no third parties.
• The network scan is done in a pseudo random
manner for load balancing and that the attacker
can not retrace and exploit the scan process.
The paper is structured as followed. Section II
explains the methodology of network scanning and
mapping. In Section III the PoC implementation is
introduced. To show the feasibility, in Section IV an
evaluation is done. At the end a conclusion is given in
Section V.
II. NETWORK MAPPING ON EDGE NODES
In a common industrial system at field level, which
is mostly IP-based nowadays, the network structure
rarely or never changes. This means that changes to the
network are either caused by maintenance, malfunc-
tions or an attack. Independent of what caused these
changes in the network environment, the incident must
be detected, because this is a deviation from regular
behavior and e.g. an operator has to decide how to
react.
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A. Related Work
There are a lot of different active and passive net-
work scanners available on the market and discussed
in research:
One of the best known network scanner is Nmap [3].
It offers a wide variety of scan options, as well as var-
ious scripts for further analysis. However, this requires
a comparatively high-performance computer compared
to an embedded Microcontroller Unit (MCU) used in
an IIoT edge node. Additionally, this is usually done
by scanning the network from a central point, which
means that either an additional scan node must be
placed in each separate subnet, or only certain subnets
can be scanned.
Wedgbury et al. [4] gave an overview of passive net-
work scanners for Industrial Control Systems (ICSs).
Furthermore, different SCADA network monitoring
tools and scanners are compared by Coffey et al.
[5]. All these specialized ICS scanners also have high
requirements on system performance and produce a
huge amount of data to process.
An Internet-wide search engine (www.censys.io) for
SCADA devices was introduced by Durumeric et al.
[6]. This is also capable of scanning internal networks
with the help of zgrab21. However, this is a full
featured active scanner that does not run on small edge
node devices either.
ModScan, a Modbus/TCP enumeration scanner, was
introduced by Bristow et al. [7]. A specialized vul-
nerability network scanner for Siemens devices was
introduced by Antrobus et al. [8], which is based on a
modified version of PLCScan2. However, these basic
scanners are written in the python scripting language
and are again not suitable for MCUs.
Wang et al. [9] and Radhappa et al. [10] summarized
the current problems and open research questions that
exist in wireless sensor networks. However, intrusion
detection is not handled by them, with regard to port
scanner and network mapping on low performance
edge node devices.
B. Methodology
In this paper, we introduce an edge node based
solution in which every smart sensor scans its own
network environment. Fig. 1 shows an example of
network mapping seen from an edge node device.
In this example network, there are 4 nodes (N1-N4)
and N1 is scanning the network in a pseudo random
periodic manner. The dashed arrows show the first scan
results with 4 devices (N1-N4) found. This first scan
is used as a reference and it must be ensured that
this network is not already contaminated. After this
an additional edge node device gets into the network
(A). Therefore, the second scan (dotted), on one hand
detects the expected devices (N1-N4) and on the other
hand also the new device (A). This could indicate an
intruder or other processes causing a change in the
network, e.g. maintenance work.
1https://github.com/zmap/zgrab2
2https://code.google.com/archive/p/plcscan/
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Fig. 1. View of the network mapping from an IIoT edge node device
of two different scans.
For the network scanning, followed by the mapping,
where the connections of the hosts get analyzed, the
following parameters can be used. These are grouped
into two classes which are introduced in the following
section, the standard port scan methods and additional
options:
• Host alive discovery:With an Internet Control
Message Protocol (ICMP) ping sweep, the active
hosts in the network can be detected.
• SYN/connect scan: Open ports and services are
detected with SYN and connect scanning.
• Optional: The ping timing can be used to de-
tect redirection, e.g. Man in the Middle (MitM)
attacks.
• Optional: On the application level, e.g. Mod-
bus/TCP, a more detailed fingerprint is possible.
Our approach combines the methods presented here
and integrates them as a security building block for
IIoT edge node devices. To the best knowledge of the
authors, no network scanner for low performance MCU
devices is available at present.
One of the biggest advantages of distributed scan is,
that different paths and subnets can be easily scanned.
This is for example the case, if networks are strongly
segmented, that the already existing IIoT edge devices
in this subnets take over the scanning themselves and
no additional scanning hardware is necessary, enabled
by a software update.
C. Host Alive Discovery
The first step that is executed in a network scan is
the detection of whether a device is active or not. This
method is called “host alive discovery” and is done
via a ping sweep on the Internet Protocol (IP) ICMP
level. If this is done in a local network, this results
in an Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) request, and
if the host answers (ARP response), it is up and is
tried to be pinged. If a host does not respond to ICMP
ping messages, that does not necessarily mean that it
is non-existent, it may also be possible that it has just
disabled ICMP echo. In this case it is possible to do a
port scan anyway, which is time consuming.
D. SYN/Connect Scan
Fig. 2 shows the flowchart of SYN and connect
scanning. If the port is closed but the host is up, the
target responds with a RST directly after the SYN
packet. If the host is up, but does not send any packet
at all, then a packet filter is active. After the target
host has answered, a RST packet is send if SYN
scanning is used. In contrast, if a connect scan is
executed the SYN+ACK message from the target host is
acknowledged and it is possible to get the Data/Banner
from the target.
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Fig. 2. Flowchart of a SYN and a connect scan with an open port
on the target.
The advantage of SYN scanning is that the data does
not reach the application level, and therefore, there are
no log entries in the application. However, since this
is not used as preparation of an attack and it is not
the goal to stay under the radar the preferred method
is a connect scan, because more information from
the target host could be collected. In addition, Soulie
[11] recommends to perform connect scans within ICS
networks to reduce influences on the process. This is
the preferred scanning method especially in fragile ICS
networks.
E. Pseudo Random Scanning
On one hand, the selection of the target host to be
scanned must be chosen randomly, as an attacker might
otherwise hide himself. And on the other hand, if more
scanners are in the network, to not flood one target.
Furthermore, the start time of the scan is randomly
chosen between one and five minutes after the edge
node is switched on. This delay after the start-up
is necessary that other devices have finished booting
and if there are multiple scanners in a network the
network load will be further distributed. For attackers
the pseudo random scanning on distributed edge nodes
makes it difficult to guess scan pattern.
F. Intrusion Detection Handling
If a new device is detected in the network, a known
device is no longer reachable, or ports/services have
changed, this should be regarded as an incident. In this
case, the edge node could go into a safe state or report
the incident to a centralized logger. This depends on
the respective field of application. The advantage here
is that the direct processing on the edge node allows
a fast and independent reaction, since there are no
dependencies and long run-times, e.g. through network
communication to a central server.
III. POC IMPLEMENTATION
To prove that the approach is feasible on an embed-
ded MCU, it was implemented for the usage in a test
environment.
A. Hardware
On the hardware side, the edge node Proof of
Concept (PoC) consists of a MCU from the ARM®
Cortex®-M7 series (STM32F767), with a custom PCB
for IO operations. Tab. I lists the features of the
development board with the MCU. The ARM®Cortex®-
M7 MCUs are the high performance series of the
energy-efficient Cortex®-M product range.
TABLE I
SPECIFICATION OF THE USED EDGE NODE HARDWARE FOR THE
POC IMPLEMENTATION.
Hardware IIoT Edge Node
Board design STMicroelectronics
MCU STM32F767ZIT6
Core ARM® Cortex®-M7
Clock up to 216 MHz
RAM 512kB
Flash 2MB
Fig. 3 shows the STM development board with our
custom Printed Circuit Board (PCB). On the right side,
the development board has a RJ-45 Ethernet connector
to connect the IIoT edge device to the network. The
development board provides an Arduino™ Uno V3
connector, where additional shields can be mounted.
This is used for our custom PCB, enabling the usage
with different MCU prototyping boards. The custom
PCB provides input and output capabilities and an
I2C display connector to show current scan informa-
tion. Additionally, Light-Emitting Diodes (LEDs) are
mounted to indicate suspicious behavior. This can be
used as in a data center, where servers which require
maintenance flash an LED. This allows a quick finding
when many devices are installed in a plant.
Display Ethernet
Inputs Outputs
NUCLEO-F767ZI Development Board LEDs
Fig. 3. Hardware platform of each IIoT edge node device based on
a STMicroelectronics development board with a custom PCB.
The current scan progress and intrusion message can
be displayed on the display of the edge node device
itself. Fig. 4 shows the 1.3 inch OLED display with a
SH1106 Inter-Integrated Circuit (I2C) driver.
Fig. 4. Scan progress and results on the edge node display.
B. Software
The software on the MCU uses FreeRTOS3 with
the LwIP4 stack. The edge node device provides a
Modbus/TCP slave, to control the input/outputs (IOs)
and a web server to provide current information.
The scan process is shown in Fig. 5. The first scan
of the network is regarded as a secure state and will be
used as a reference for later scans. After this, the scans
are executed periodically and the results are compared
with the results of the initial scan, which is treated
as a trusted dataset. In case any mismatch is detected
during the following scans, the intrusion handling is
initiated.
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Fig. 5. High level view of the scan process. After the first/trusted
scan a continuous monitoring is running.
The scan module is designed as a task in FreeRTOS
and could be used as a building block in other devices
as well.
Fig. 6 shows the current debug output of a scanning
edge node device. On the lower left side, the data of the
trusted scan can be seen, which serves as a reference
data-set. On the lower right side, the output of the
current scan progress is illustrated. The IP with the
alive status is printed and also the open Transmisson
Control Protocoll (TCP) ports.
This representation is not for productive usage, be-
cause attackers could use this information for aimed
attacks. Preferably, only the intrusion message with
the changes is sent cryptographically protected to a
centralized logger or only allows authenticated user
access. However, this set-up depends heavily on the
integration of the scanners, e.g. if there are local
operators with access to Human Machine Interfaces
(HMIs) or a centralized control, who can react to the
incident.
3https://www.freertos.org/
4https://savannah.nongnu.org/projects/lwip/
First Scan
IP: 192.168.001.010 up
Ports: 22 
IP: 192.168.001.040 up
Ports: 22 
IP: 192.168.001.050 up
Ports: 22 502 
IP: 192.168.001.101 up
Ports: 80 502 
STM32F767 Sensor Scan Server
Called URL: / HTTP/1
Build: Jan 29 2019 14:45:38
Device ID: 0000000002
Uptime MS: 0014599648 ms
Free heap: 0000066536 bytes
Own IP: 192.168.001.102 
Intrusion: 0000000000 
Scanning: 192.168.001.074 
Scanning: 00000 
Scan Round: 1 
Refresh  Soft Reset  Set Intrusion  Reset Intrusion
Current Scan
IP: 192.168.001.010 up
Ports: 22 
IP: 192.168.001.040 up
Ports: 22 
IP: 192.168.001.050 up
Ports: 22 502 
Fig. 6. Webpage running on the edge node, displaying the current
scan status and debug output.
IV. EVALUATION
To show the feasibility of our approach an evalu-
ation is done. This is divided into four parts. First,
the feasibility in our open-source industrial testbed is
measured, then the network performance is evaluated,
after this the MCU requirements are measured, and at
the end the attack detection is evaluated.
A. Industrial Testbed
The PoC implementation is evaluated in our open
source industrial testbed (Fig. 7). There, the introduced
network scanner is running on each IIoT edge node,
which are all accessed and controlled by an OpenPLC
[12] instance over Modbus/TCP running on a Rasp-
berry Pi. Eight edge nodes are each connected to one
sensor and one edge node is connected to a motor
rotating a disc. Furthermore, there is a HMI displaying
the current state of all edge node devices.
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Physical
process
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Server/Logger
Fig. 7. Pictures of the open source ICS testbed, which is controlling
a physical process over Modbus/TCP.
B. Network Performance Measurement
Fig. 8 shows the number of packets per second
during scanning of one edge node in the open-source
testbed. As shown in [13], high scan rates can affect the
control behavior of Programmable Logic Controllers
(PLCs). Therefore, the amount of packets must be
low, depending on the components in the network.
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Fig. 8. Plot over time, with packets per second of an edge node scanning the network. ARP and ICMP ping requests are used to check if
the hosts are up. TCP connect scans are done if the host is up.
As an example, the parameter in our testbed is set to
100ms delay between pings, which affects the number
of packets per second of ARP and ICMP packets.
This wait time between packets is set to a high value,
because ARP requests are broadcast to the complete
broadcast domain and, as a result of this, it affects all
devices within this subnet. Further, the delay between
each single port scan is also set to 100ms to reduce
the network load. Both delays can be changed easily to
fulfill the custom requirements of a certain industrial
network.
At the begin, the scan is delayed for a random
time of some seconds, that, after a power up, not all
edge nodes start scanning the same IP at a time (see
Section II-E). After this, ARP requests for each IP
address are sent out, resulting in a maximum of 4
packets/s. If an ARP response is received, an ICMP
ping is executed (max 4 packets/s). This means that
the host is reachable and the first 1024 TCP ports
are scanned, which is done with a maximum of about
25 packets per second. This depends on the state of
the port, e.g. if it is open or closed. In comparison,
the standard Modbus/TCP traffic in our testbed is
about 400 packets per second between each node and
the PLC. To distribute the load, if more nodes are
scanning, the host selection is pseudo randomized (see
Section II-E).
An overview of packet sizes is given in Tab. II. For
example, 25 SYN packets/s with a size of 60 bytes
each generate a throughput of 1500 bytes/s (12 kbits/s).
The 25 packets/s is a mixed calculation for open and
closed ports, since, for example, with closed ports, only
one ACK+RST returns from the target. In contrast to
that, an open port results in a three-way handshake as
illustrated in Fig. 2.
C. MCU Requirements
Tab. III shows the build output of the different
sections in bytes. The FreeRTOS task uses a maximum
of 2048 words and can run with a low priority. Addi-
tionally, the time between packets can be set to a high
value, which results in a sleep (blocked state) of the
scan task, whereby other operations can be performed.
Most of the MCUs enabling networking should have
enough performance to handle the additional scan
TABLE II
DATA SIZE OF DIFFERENT PACKETS FROM OUR SCANNER OR AS A
RESPONSE TO IT.
Packet Bytes
ARP request 60
ARP reply 60
ICMP ping request 74
ICMP ping reply 74
TCP SYN 60
TCP SYN/RST 60
TCP SYN/ACK 60
TCP FIN 60
Example SSH banner 95
TABLE III
BINARY COMPARISON OF EXAMPLE APPLICATION WITH AND
WITHOUT SCANNER.
Information text data bss dec hex
With scanner 140040 12588 293704 446332 6cf7c
Without scanner 129368 12588 293552 435508 6a534
Difference 10672 0 152 10824 2a48
task, because of the relatively low RAM and ROM
requirements. Nevertheless, by optimizing the code, the
requirements of the scan building block can be further
reduced.
D. Attacker and Detection Consideration
The detection in the testbed depends on the sce-
nario and the configuration of the attacker device.
Furthermore, a trusted scan with a clean network at
the beginning must be ensured. For this reason, five
possible attack scenarios are modeled:
1 One edge node is removed from the network. This
can happen, e.g., when an attacker removes the
device or by a malfunction. The type of attack
requires little knowledge of the specific target.
Therefore, the attacker is considered weak.
2 Services offered in the network have disappeared
or new services have been added. This can happen
when an adversary attacks services which crash
or introduces back-doors that open new ports.
This type of attack requires a moderate attacker
knowledge, because changes to the network are
made.
3 An attacker attaches a standard configured com-
puter to the network. There is no special config-
uration made by the attacker to be undetectable.
Adding a computer to perform e.g. a port scan
requires little knowledge, which can be done by
a weak attacker.
4 A MitM attack is executed. In this case, the
attacker has complete control over the traffic
between two or more network participants. This
enables viewing and manipulating the data. For
this scenario, the attacker model is medium, be-
cause of the necessary high privileges.
5 An attacker is performing a “stealth” attack [14].
For example, the attacker is passively listening
to the network traffic and makes a “stealth” port
scan. This passive attack is a special attack on a
network, where a system is secretly monitored and
scanned e.g. for open ports and vulnerabilities.
The purpose is solely to collect information about
the network and hosts. No data is being injected
into the destination network by the attacker. This
scenarios requires a strong attacker model, be-
cause of the necessary knowledge.
For scenario 1 , our network scanner detects the
changes, because the host is not reachable by pings
anymore and can handle the intrusion. If services with
open ports change (scenario 2 ), they are detected
by the port scan. A standard configured computer
(scenario 3 ) even without open ports can be found by
ICMP pings. If a MitM attack (scenario 4 ) is executed,
in some cases the latency of pings is getting higher.
In this case, the MitM attack could be detected by
analyzing the ping timing, otherwise it is not possible
with this approach. Stealth attacks or passive listening
(scenario 5 ) cannot be detected by active scanning
methods, like the here presented edge node scanner.
Tab. IV summarizes the detection of the different
scenarios.
TABLE IV
SUMMARY OF THE EVALUATED ATTACK SCENARIOS AND
DETECTION CAPABILITIES.
Model Short description Attacker Detection Mechanism
1 Node removed weak  ICMP ping
2 Service changed medium  SYN scan
3 Standard attack weak  ICMP ping
4 MitM attack medium  timing
5 Stealth attack strong  –
detected dependent not detected
E. “Stealth” Attacker Configuration
Case 5 is possible, if the attacker suppresses any
network interaction from outside, has no open ports,
and disables ICMP echo (Listing 1).
Listing 1. Command to disable ARP and ICMP echo in Linux
1 echo "1" > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/icmp_echo_ignore_all
2 ip link set dev enp0s31f6 arp off
In this case, it is not possible for the network scanner
to detect the device. Though, the attacker must know,
if there is a continuous network scanning to get not
detected. Additionally, knowledge is required how the
network is configured and in local networks is not
allowed to response to ARP requests.
However, the evaluation in our testbed has shown
the feasibility of our approach with a minimum of
additional network load. Furthermore, it is possible
to link this security building block with other, e.g. in
combination with intrusion detection systems.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced a network scanning and
mapping building block for embedded low-cost IIoT
edge node devices. We showed the feasibility of our
approach in our open-source industrial testbed. Our ac-
tive scanner network mapping approach is lightweight
and the results are clear and detailed in contrast to most
passive network monitoring approaches.
The amount of additional traffic in the network with
our sample configuration with a mean of 4 packets/s
and peeks up to 25 packets/s from a single edge node
is low and could be adjusted if necessary. Furthermore,
the integration of our FreeRTOS scanning task and the
configuration for the network can easily be done in
other projects. With our building block the security
level of low-cost edge node devices, e.g. for securing
the IIoT, can be increased.
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